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A REQUIEM FOR REQUIEMS: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF REALITY
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.*
The Law is not a homeless, wandering ghost. It is a phase of human
Zife located in time and space.
-M. R. Cohen, Reason and Law

the December 1969 issue of the Michigan Law Review, Professor David Engdahl, in an article entitled "Requiem for Roth," 1
became the most recent writer to tell us that current obscenity
dogma is less than satisfactory, and to propose a fresh approach.
Professor Engdahl thus picked up a cudgel in a battle that probably
began six thousand years ago in some cave in Asia Minor. A wall
artist, tired of drawing twelve-legged water buffalo, decided to try
his hand at homo sapiens in his sporting moments. Hauled before
the tribal council, the primordial graffitist muttered something
about the social importance of his work. A few tribesmen nodded
approval; but the elders modestly rearranged their loincloths and
wagged their heads, speaking ruefully of the decadence that threatened the very foundation of civilization as cavemen knew it. When
the council rendered a verdict (probably a conviction, since very
little erotic cave art has been found), somebody suggested that the
council's standards were vague and unrealistic and proposed a new
formulation.
Proposals for "new standards" in obscenity cases would not be
particularly troublesome but for the fact that the Court has occasionally listened to them. When it has, it has often complicated the
situation further. Professor Engdahl modestly asserts that his proposals are not really new, but are "familiar" standards, "detailed
with new precision." 2 In essence, he suggests abandonment of the
"incorporation" approach to the fourteenth amendment-an approach which we are told "has muddied the waters of constitutional
jurisprudence ... ever since Justices Black and Douglas joined the
Court."3 According to Engdahl, the Court has never "genuinely
endorsed" this "doctrine of Black and Douglas."4 Professor Engdahl
N

I

• Professor of Law, Ohio State University. A.B. 1955, Miami University; J.D. 1960,
Ohio State University.-Ed.
I. Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REv.
185 (1969).
2. Id. at 235.
3. Id. at 202.
4. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
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proposes a return to a "substantive due process" theory which is akin
to, but is not in fact, the "ordered liberty" concept established in
Palko v. Connecticut 5 and tenaciously kept alive by Justice Harlan.
Inasmuch as Engdahl's proposals involve far more than the obscenity area in their implications, it seems less than likely that they
will be adopted. However, with President Nixon diligently pursuing
his purpose of "balancing" the Supreme Court with "strict constructionists," all things are possible. In my opinion, such dubious revisionism is neither a proper response to the obscenity problem nor at
all called for at this critical juncture in American history.
I.

THE WAKE OF ROTH

It is true that the test set out in Roth v. United States 6 is moribund. In a sense it was stillborn. While five Justices, only one of
whom remains on the Court, joined in the majority opinion in
Roth, that case only adumbrated certain considerations that later
were forged into what has come to be known as the Roth test. No
sooner did the forging process begin than the Court became fragmented on this issue, and a majority of the Justices has never since
concurred in the test-certainly not in a compatible formulation
of it. Today, it is not clear that anyone on the Court adheres to
the test, other than its parent and guardian, Justice Brennan. The
"requiem" for Roth, Professor Engdahl suggests, has been played
in three recent obscenity cases, Ginzburg v. United States,1 Ginsberg
v. New York, 8 and Stanley v. Georgia. 9 In a way, each of these cases
can be attributed to an effort on the Court's part to utilize the suggestions of academic commentators aimed at improving or clarifying
constitutional standards for obscenity.10 Dean Lockhart and Professor McClure were explicitly given credit for the concept of "variable obscenity"11 which formed the Court's conceptual basis in
5. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
8. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
9. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
IO. With regard to the role that legal theoreticians have played in bringing the
constitutional doctrine on obscenity to its present state, it bears passing mention that
the core of the Roth test was borrowed from a tentative draft of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code. See 354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
II. Lockhart &: McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional IssueWhat Is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1961). Dean Lockhart is currently chairman
of the special Federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, created by Congress in 1967 and scheduled to report by July 31, 1970.
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Ginsberg v. New York; 12 but their ideas could also explain the other
two cases as well. Each case proceeds on the premise that the constitutional law of obscenity could be made more rational if the Court
focused less on the nature of the erotic material per se and looked
more to the context in which it became the subject of a lawsuit.
Of the three cases only Stanley can be said to have added clarity
to the law. There is certainty in the rule that private possession of
even hard-core pornography, for personal use in one's own home, is
constitutionally protected. Stanley presents civil-liberties lawyers
and professional obscenity la'wyers with many opportunities to
build greater protection on its base. For example, one can argue
that Stanley implies support for a constitutional right to carry
pornography home for private use, to display it noncommercially to
one's friends, or to supply it for such use. The case may also portend
changes outside the area of erotica, in areas such as that involving
the "perpetration" in private of consensual "morality" offenses. Of
course, the decision should not be criticized solely on the basis
that it may be extended, for law is made of such stuff.
Ginzburg v. United States, 13 on the other hand, is the most
demonstrably unsatisfactory application of the contextual approach.
By adding the element (or quasi-element) of "pandering,''14 it
simply injected another problematical criterion into an area already
overstocked with such futility-producing criteria. To everyone except Ginzburg, the most tangible result of that case has been the
practice of publishers to place on even the hardest-core pornography
legends proclaiming the serious, benign, scientific, artistic, and educational nature of its purpose.H• It is to be hoped that the "pander12. 390 U.S. at 635 n.4.
13. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
14. 383 U.S. at 471, 475-76.
15. For example, the January 26, 1970, issue of SCREW, THE SEX REVIEW contains
the following legend, mostly in fine print, in a small black box on the front cover:
WARNING, ADULT TYPE SEX MATERIAL
THIS LITERATURE Is Nor INTENDED FOR MINORS AND UNDER No CIRCUMSTANCES ARE
THEY To VIEW IT, POSSESS IT, OR PLACE ORDERS FOR THE MERCHANDISE OFFERED
HEREIN,

To THE NEWSDEALER: You are warned not to sell this newspaper to a minor. If
you do it will be ground for refusal to serve you with future issues. The editors
of this newspaper have made every effort to insure that the contents of this
publication are not obscene or pornographic under the law, common sense, or
contemporary standards of candor in sex.
Do NOT PURCHASE SCREW IF You WANT PORNOGRAPHY!
Another publication, EROTICA, depicting males and females and pairs of females embracing with exposed genitalia, contains the following legend, [reprinted in part]:
for mature adults • • • as a pictorial representation of phases and mores of our
contemporary society • • • • Editorial content is not to be construed as descriptive or to condone any action.
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ing" rule of Ginzburg will simply fade away. By contrast, Ginsberg
v. New Y ork16 has touched off a spate of legislative activity, both
federal and state; but unfortunately, its future promises only more
confusion.17 In that case, Justice Brennan formulated the issues in
such a manner as to permit him to proclaim in abstract form the
principle that there can be a separate constitutional standard for
those erotic materials that are made available to minors. Despite
Justice Fortas' urging,18 Justice Brennan did not even suggest the
outlines of that separate standard. In response to Justice Brennan's
opinion, legislative draftsmen, following a time-honored practice,
have slavishly copied the bizarre New York statute involved in that
case, despite the fact that the Ginsberg decision never clearly approved the statute as such. 19
16. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
17. The New York statute involved in Ginsberg [Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, 1
[1965] Laws of N.Y. 1066, as amended, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20-.21 (McKinney 1967)],
and reprinted as an appendix to that case at 645-47 and in Engdahl, supra note 1, at
195 n.66, takes an unusual and largely disfunctional approach to the problem of
erotica and minors. First, it sets forth a detailed and rather bizarre catalogue of subjects that might be considered obscene. That catalogue includes such gems as "the
female breast with less than fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the
top of the nipple" and "flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed." This portion of the
statute seems to be in line with the idea of Mr. Richard H. Kuh that obscenity can
be defined "objectively," that is, by specification of the physical scenes to be proscribed. R. KuH, FoousH FIGLEAVES (1967). Kuh is still urging this position on legislative committees. 28 CONG. Q. 757 (1970). The New York legislature, however, recognized that the catalogue approach alone would be unworkable. For example, the
first phrase quoted above from the statute could prevent minors from viewing many
works of art long considered acceptable even for the very young. The second phrase
could be applied to a wide variety of patently nonobscene material, such as a circus
picture depicting the pretended arrest of one clown by another. Consequently, the
New York legislature added a modified Roth test to the statute-modified to make a
hypothetical minor the touchstone with regard to contemporary standards of candor,
prurient interest, and social importance. This latter, operative portion of the statute
makes the catalogue largely superfluous.
18. 390 U.S. at 673-75 Gustice Fortas, dissenting).
19. As Justice Brennan interpreted the record in Ginsberg, the appellants' counsel
attacked the statute "on its face,'' thus relieving the Court of the responsibility of determining whether the particular erotic materials that formed the basis for Ginsberg's
conviction could constitutionally be banned as "harmful to minors." As Justice Fortas
pointed out in dissent, this was a dubious process for at least two reasons. First, it may
have broken with the Court's tradition of not allowing counsels' position to have an
undue influence on the Court's stewardship of constitutional law. See A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), particularly at 133-43. Second, it left government and
citizens with very little guidance as to the emerging standards in this area. 390 U.S.
at 671-73 Gustice Fortas, dissenting). In fact, it can fairly be said that, by passing upon
the New York statute in such abstract formulation, the Court did not approve even
the statute itself. For while the concept of the statute-a different constitutional
standard when minors are involved-is now judicially sanctioned, the statute could
prove to be constitutionally unworkable in any subsequent concrete case. Certainly,
insofar as the statute is modeled along Roth lines, it poses all the same problems
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Thus, Roth is indeed dead, although perhaps not beyond resurrection. But before talking about further reforms, one might profitably try to look at the shape of the phoenix that has arisen from its
meager ashes. One need not accept the mystical view of commonlaw jurists that law always exists on every subject, in order to accept the proposition that previously existing legal doctrines cannot
be abandoned without giving some hint of what now exists in their
place, even if it is simply the outline of the void created by their
departure. A few vague and unrelated principles, then, can be
drawn from the cases which have eroded Roth. A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts 20 seems to imply that material containing even
a scintilla of redeeming social importance will normally be protected-a position which appears to bring the Court close to Justice
Stewart's hard-core-pornography test. Redrup v. New York 21 tells
us that soft-core, and even not-so-soft-core, pornography is acceptable
because, in the Court's view, it meets contemporary national community standards. Ginsberg v. New York warns us that we are on
shaky grounds when we deal with minors; and Ginzburg v. United
States instructs us to be discreet with respect to our sales techniques,
even if we are not discreet with regard to what we have for sale.
Finally, Stanley tells us that if we can get our pornography home, we
are home free.
Assuming (as a matter of convenience rather than conviction)
that the Nixon appointees to the Court will tend toward a more
restrictive, rather than a less restrictive, attitude regarding erotic
materials, these rules do not seem to be in imminent danger of
change. In Memoirs six Justices concurred in the result, while three
dissented. Two of the majority have departed; but so has Justice
Clark, a dissenter, and he was replaced by Justice Marshall, the
author of the Stanley opinion. Of the two dissenters in Redrup
only Justice Harlan remains, with Justice Clark now replaced by
the apparently more tolerant Marshall. In Stanley three Justices
withheld opinion on the obscenity issue because they felt that the
conviction should have been reversed on the grounds of an illegal
search and seizure. There is, however, no reason to think that any
which that case presented. Engdahl asserts that Ginsberg held that rationality is the
only limit on legislative action concerning distribution of erotica to minors. Engdahl,
supra note I, at 196. He cites pages 641 to 643 of the opinion in support of that assertion. Id. at 196 n.74. But Justice Fortas and many others saw no such connotation in
the passages referred to.
20. 383 U.S. 413 (1966)
21. 386 U.S. 767 (1967)
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of those three Justices (Stewart, White, and Brennan) would necessarily vote to overrule Stanley. Furthermore, the presence in the
Stanley majority of Justice Harlan, with his deference to states' authority, should act to stabilize that opinion.

II.

TRUTH REDISCOVERED

Now back to Professor Engdahl. As noted previously, he begins
with an attack on the "incorporation" approach to the fourteenth
amendment-the doctrine which he claims has muddied constitutional waters and which "no majority of the Court has ever genuinely endorsed." 22 That assertion is quite misleading. While only
Justice Black and perhaps Justice Douglas continue to assert the
wholesale incorporation or "shorthand version of the Bill of Rights"
theory, it is generally accepted that most of the operative provisions
of the Bill of Rights have been "selectively" incorporated. For example, none of the current Justices, save Harlan and now apparently Burger,23 has ever suggested that the fourteenth amendment
provides weaker protection of freedom of expression against state
action than the first amendment provides against federal action.
Professor Engdahl prefers to call selective incorporation the "guidance" doctrine24-a characterization which is accurate insofar as it
describes the process by which incorporation takes place. Rather
than holding that the due process clause is simply a coded reference
to the Bill of Rights, the Court has acknowledged that the first
eight amendments, as developed through the case law, usually provide the best available definitions of due process and liberty.
Of course, there has been debate about what "incorporation"
means. For instance, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter fought this
battle in the area of search and seizure. Although Wolf v. Colorado 2G
adopted the prohibition against illegal search and seizure as part of
the fourteenth amendment's protection, it was not until lviapp v.
Ohio26 that the exclusionary rule was incorporated into the due
process clause. Even after that case, the question arose, in Ker v.
California, 21 as to what extent the federal case law and statutes defining illegal search and seizure should be made applicable to state
action. While the federal statute at issue in Ker was deemed to
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Engdahl, supra note I, at 203.
See Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969).

Engdahl, supra note I, at 204 n.102.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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be irrelevant insofar as it set a supraconstitutional standard for
federal officers, it is generally understood that incorporation entails
utilization of all relevant Bill of Rights doctrine in similar stateaction cases.
"While Engdahl makes a plausible argument that early cases
such as Gitlow v. New York28 and Whitney v. California29 suggest
that there is a weaker protection for free speech against state action
than there is against federal action, the immediate response to his
admonition that such cases should not be "dismissed as archaic"30
is: "Why not?" The fact that the ap}lroach of those cases is one which
"has been obscured and then forgotten, rather than deliberately
rejected" 31 is hardly an adequate reason for their revival. The casebooks are "full of clinkers" that went the same way. The more relevant question is, what is ·wrong with incorporation, or, alternatively,
why is some other approach preferable?
One problem with incorporation, according to Engdahl, is that
although it was originally designed to supplant the "obstructionist"
use of substantive due process by the laissez-faire Old Guard, it
has not really done that.32 This proposition is erroneous both as to
the origin of the incorporation doctrine and as to its effect. Obstructionism was initially eliminated by substituting, as the touchstone
of substantive due process, the flexible standard of "rationality"
for judicially created "liberties," such as "freedom to contract" and
"freedom to follow a lawful occupation." 33 Incorporation, on the
other hand, was advanced as a foil to the rationality concept of due
process, when it became apparent that the concept of judicial
restraint was being used to strip the fourteenth amendment of its
real substance-the protection of civil rights and liberties against
hostile state action.34 "While one must concede that there is considerable validity in Justice Frankfurter's frequent protestations
that the difference between obstructionism and vigilant judicial
28. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
29. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
30. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 207.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 202.
33. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), with Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Professor Engdahl may have been misled by
some of Justice Black's latter-day pronouncements on the limiting aspects of the incorporation doctrine. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 509-10 (1965)
Gustice Black, dissenting). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947)
Gustice Black, dissenting).
34. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) at 68 Gustice Black, dissenting),
and at 123 Gustice Murphy, dissenting).
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protection of liberty is primarily in the eye of the beholder,35 it is
nevertheless clear that the Court has seen through the haziness of
this distinction well enough to prevent incorporation from resurrecting review of so-called "economic-relations cases."36 For better
or worse, a fourteenth amendment claim is virtually dead when it
is classified as "economic." Thus, Professor Engdahl is simply
wrong in concluding that incorporation failed to eliminate the obstructionist use of substantive due process.
A lucid and persuasive exposition of the nature and purpose
of the incorporation process is set forth in a footnote to Justice
White's opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana: 31
In one sense recent cases applying the provisions of the first eight
amendments to the states represent a new approach to the "incorpo•
ration" debate. Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked . . .
if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the
particular protection.... The recent cases, on the other hand, have
proceeded on the valid assumption that state criminal processes are
not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems .... The
question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental . . . . Of each of these determinations that a
constitutional provision originally written to bind the Federal Government should bind the states as well it might be said that the limitation in question is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every
criminal system that might be imagined but it is fundamental in the
context of the criminal processes maintained by the American
States.38

While state criminal process was of "immediate relevance for the
case" 39 there under consideration, this approach toward incorporation need not be limited to that context. If liberty requires models
in a relatively closed system such as criminal process, can anyone
seriously argue that guidelines are superfluous in the free-wheeling
body politic, or that worthy traditions are any less deserving of
perpetuation simply because they touch on an aspect of life other
than criminal trial procedure?
35. See Frankfurter, Self-Willed Judges and the Judicial Function, in AN AUTOBI441 (A. Westin ed. 1963).
36. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Engdahl's argument to
the contrary is based upon the point, so intriguing to law students, that if the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights absolutely
in toto, it incorporates a mirror-image of itself in the fiftb amendment.
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
38. 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14.
39. 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14.
OGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT
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WHY .ANYBODY CAN TAKE AN OATH
To SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION

It finally emerges that the real reason that Professor Engdahl
does not like incorporation is that, despite his apparent admiration
of Justice Harlan and his scorn of Justices Black and Douglas, he
is something of a literalist (and, of course, who is not).
Careful attention to the language of the Constitution may try the
patience of some who prefer recourse to dogmatic generalities; but
if a written constitution is to have genuine meaning, the language
of the document must be relevant in constitutional adjudication. We
are not bound to the unascertainable "intent of the framers"; moreover "it is a constitution we are expounding," that is, it is "a constituent act [which has] called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted
of its begetters." But whatever construction we might put upon it,
we are not free to disregard the language of the document. Faithfulness to language dictates neither "conservative" nor "liberal"
interpretation, but it does provide the only basis to legitimate whatever ultimate decision is made. 4o
Engdahl has some difficulty with the line between literalism and
"expounding a constitution [which has] called into life a being."
His very next sentence after the above quotation is, "Life, property,
and corporal liberty are protected by the fourteenth amendment." 41
The reconciliation between Professor Engdahl's literalism on the
one hand and his preference for Justice Harlan over Justices Black
and Douglas on the other, is that since the fourteenth amendment
literally refers only to "due process" (not to free speech or free
press), the literalist approach to the problem of protecting free expression against state action should be one of a more flexible
standard of "substantive due process."
Professor Engdahl's earlier favorable reference to Justice Harlan
might suggest that they would both come out at about the same
place. This is not true. Nearly everyone has assumed that adoption
of Justice Harlan's Palko formulation regarding state regulation of
erotica would result in far greater latitude for state suppression of
such material than is available to the federal government. 42 Review
40. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 214. (Citations to Justices Marshall and Holmes
omitted.).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. This includes Justice Harlan himself who wrote:
Federal suppression of allegedly obscene matter should, in my view, be constitutionally limited to that often described as "hard-core pornography" . . . • State
obscemty laws present quite a different order . . . . From my standpoint, the
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of state action on the basis of fundamental fairness is simply a prevention-of-atrocities doctrine.43 Thus, Justice Harlan would require
only that states act "rationally" in suppressing erotica. Presumably
Anthony Comstock appeared rational to many.44
Professor Engdahl, on the other hand, has in mind a much more
vigorous concept of substantive due process. Much of his discussion
in this portion of his article is concerned with enumerating £actors
involved in an adjudication based on substantive due process. Substantive due process has been simply stated as a requirement that
the legislation in question be a rational means to a legitimate end.
Professor Engdahl points out that this test can be broken down411
into such considerations as (1) "the legitimacy of the state interest,"46
(2) "the substantiality of a legitimate state interest,"47 and (3) "[t]he
means-to-end relationship between the legislation and the state
interest."48 However, under his final consideration-(4) "the effect
of countervailing interests"49-Professor Engdahl reveals that all the
hubbub over incorporation may be just a tempest in a teapot: "The
greatest interest to be weighed against any state interest claimed to
justify state suppression of expression, however, is the interest of a
free people in the freedom of speech itself."50
What the incorporation problem is all about is determining
when countervailing interests ought to be taken into account. When
no defined personal right exists, substantive due process requires
only that the state act rationally-which in our pluralistic society
means that it may do virtually anything. 51 When a countervailing
Fourteenth Amendment requires of a state only that it apply criteria rationally
related to the accepted notions of obscenity and that it reach results not wholly
out of step with current American standards . • • • As to the States, the due
latitude my approach would leave them insures that only the unusual case would
require plenary review and correction by the Court.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457-58 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
43. See, e.g., R:ochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
44. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) Gustice Harlan, dissenting); cf.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968), arguing that
even the greatest excesses of Comstock could pass a rationality test.
45. The scientific method encompasses both the processes of empiricism and reductionism. Empiricism usually uncovers the fact that things are more complicated than
they seem. Reductionism attempts to resimplify things by finding unifying concepts at
a deeper level. Thus the process is complementary and progressive. The trouble with
semantic legal analysis is the danger of going back and forth over the same ground.
46. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 228.
47. Id. at 232.
48. Id. at 233.
49. Id. at 234.
50. Id.
51. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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right does exist, by incorporation or otherwise, the state must show
a "compelling" interest. 52 The compelling interest in the case of
free expression is alleviation of a "clear and present danger that
[the words] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." 53 It is true, as Engdahl points out, that penumbra! rights, such as privacy,54 can occasionally be cut from whole
cloth-that is, they can be based upon values not specifically alluded to in the Constitution. But why advocate cutting them from
whole cloth, when the venerable Bill of Rights suppl~es sturdier
material? Nothing would be simplified or even necessarily changed
in result by Engdahl's reform. The Court would simply undermine
its doctrinal framework for the protection not only of erotica but
of free expression in toto, at a time when that protection is needed
as never before.

IV.

ECHOES OF THE THIRTIES

Engdahl concedes that Congress has the power to regulate the
interstate transportation of prostitutes,55 thus accepting Hoke v.
United States; 56 but he denies that it has delegated power under
the commerce clause to regulate the interstate shipment of erotica,
except when the recipient is nonconsenting.57 In this discussion his
reasoning becomes a bit tortured. First, he affirms a truism: that
the mere fact that Congress can regulate a subject, such as prostitution or erotica, when that subject has a connection with, or an effect
on, interstate commerce does not mean that it has general power
over the same subject when that subject has "no connection with
or effect upon interstate commerce." 58 Then he states: "The same
illogic necessary to sustain such bootstrap omnicompetence would
be necessary to sustain federal obscenity legislation under even the
broadest interpretation of the clear and present danger test." 59 The
reference to the clear and present danger test is simply poor analysis. That Congress cannot exercise its power under the commerce
clause in derogation of the first amendment is also a self-evident
truth. But it adds nothing to clarity of thinking to attempt to speak
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Sherbert v. Verner, 372 U.S. 398 (1963).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 218.
227 U.S. 308 (1913).
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 219-20.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
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of a first amendment limitation on power in terms of a lack of delegated power under article I. 60
The problem of standards is, however, more than academic (in
the pejorative sense). In the near future, Congress may quite possibly pass new federal obscenity legislation dealing with offerings
to minors, based upon Congress' belief that Ginsberg v. New York
offers the federal government as well as the states some additional
freedom to regulate. 61 The Justices might well be laughed off the
bench if they strike down such legislation on the basis of a lack of
congressional power under the commerce and postal clauses.

V.

LIFE, SEX~ AND FREEDOM

The Bill of Rights offered us an experiment in legally sanctioned
freedom of expression-an experiment that was not really begun
until the twentieth century. Even now it is only grudgingly accepted by a majority of American citizens. The majority has usually
believed that at least three areas ought to be permanently excluded
from the experiment: sedition, libel, and obscenity. For historical
reasons each of these areas was treated differently. Obscenity, it was
once said, is outside the protective scope of the first amendment
because by definition it is devoid of social importance. 62 But Justice
Holmes told us that the experiment in freedom is an experiment in
life itself, 63 and Freud told us that sex is most relevant to life. Still,
the majority has generally believed that the practice of sex should
be relegated to the marital bedroom, or to the discreet affair, with
discussion and depiction of it relegated to the locker room and
latrine walls.
In a cautious effort to open up the public arena for "serious"
discussion the Court once held that such discussion, if it takes place
in a tasteful manner, is fully protected by the first and fourteenth
60. The analysis also does not explain why Congress could regulate the interstate
shipment of erotica to unwilling recipients. Engdahl refers to the "right of privacy,''
but none of the cases cited indicates that Congress has been delegated the power to
legislate protection for the right of privacy. Of course, it is possible to say that what
the federal courts can adjudicate Congress may legislate. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 375 (1924). But why such an inchoate power as this could override the first
amendment when the formidable commerce power cannot is also left unexplained. It is
possible to make an intellectually satisfying argument against the general use of the
commerce power to regulate for patently noncommercial objectives, but Engdahl does
not make that argument.
61. See H.R. ll,031, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and S. 2073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), which have the backing of the Administration.
62. R. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES 17-21 (1967),
63. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
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amendments. 64 Naturally, since sex is fun (or something like fun),
the purveyors of fun for fun's sake followed the Court's decisions
with as close an eye as did the heavy-minded Lawrences and Joyces.
Finally, some people began to believe that sex is not only fun but
good fun; and good fun, 65 it seems, has redeeming social importance
in and of itself. Still others argued, somewhat persuasively, that
even the hardest-core pornography may have value, even if only to
show that once we have had our fill of the forbidden fruit, we will
learn that it is not really all that much; and we will then turn to a
search for a more realistic attitude toward this most vital of life
forces. 66
Nevertheless, this remains a minority position, and the majority
today is in no mood to accept minority opinion lightly. The pertinent questions are what the Court can, should, and will do next
in its continuing quest to preserve breathing room for minority
views. It is submitted that the time has come for the Court to hold
that the Constitution permits no censorship or suppression of
erotica in the case of its distribution to consenting adults. There
is no substantial evidence that legalized distribution of even hardcore pornography is socially or even personally harmful, 67 and there
is some evidence that its suppression may have detrimental effects. 68
Strong popular support for control of erotica was formerly based
upon the following paradigm, which appealed to "common-sense"
analysis: A person with strong sexual drives becomes sexually
aroused by viewing erotic literature or an erotic performance; and
unable-for personal, social, psychological, or financial reasons--to
find anyone willing to satisfy his aroused drives, he forces his attention on an unwilling victim. Deeper analysis, however, disproves
this paradigm. First, it has been shown that when we deal with
the violent sex criminal, we are dealing with a small, abnormal element.69 The Kronhausen study indicated that many of these people
tend to have strong inhibitions against sexual fantasies and that
often their conduct is an "acting out" of drives never allowed to
64. Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). The earlier cases
following Roth seemed to be mere extensions of this principle, that is, they recognized
that an artist might need to discuss or depict sexual conduct, to some limited extent,
in order to make his point about sex.
65. See, e.g., L. ULLERSTAM, THE EROTIC MINORITIF.5 (1966).
66. E. KRONHAUSEN &: P. KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 263 (1959).
67. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 424, 431-33 (Justice Douglas, concurring) and the authorities cited therein.
68. E. KRONHAUSEN, supra note 66, at 261-89.
69. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11-13 (1968).

1402

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:1389

reach consciousness.70 Second, empirical evidence, and common
sense, indicate that sexual stimuli are relative and omnipresent.71
If this is so, then the quantity of sexual stimuli is, for the most part,
constant; it is only its nature that changes.72 In any event, the law
has recognized, since it rejected Regina v. Hicklin, 13 that it cannot
attempt to keep the community free from any sexual stimulus that
might affect a deranged mind.
The argument that pornography promotes introversion and disrupts more desirable interpersonal contacts74 flounders because it
fails to prove which is the cause and which is the effect. It may be
more likely that those who turn excessively to pornography are
already blocked against desirable interpersonal relationships. Pornography may in fact provide a release for such persons and have
the desirable result of preventing the eruption of violent, destructive, and antisocial interpersonal encounters.75
An initially provocative argument against pornography was
made last year by Harry Clor.76 The essence of Clor's thesis is that
pornography degrades human life in a world that already values
human life too little. Clar candidly admits that his argument applies
to many materials which do not possess an overtly sexual theme;
hence he would expand his definition of obscenity to include materials depicting or describing such things as torture, brutality, mutilation, or morbidity, even if no overtly sexual motif appears. But Clar
proves too much. While everyone might agree that much that is
written, spoken, or depicted today degrades the human condition,
everyone would not agree on which particular items are degrading.
The experiment in freedom of expression does not allow us to impose majority judgment as to what does and does not degrade
humanity. Thus, as Clar himself concedes, there is no clear basis
for distinguishing between degrading material that is overtly sexual
and other degrading material.77
70. E. KRONHAUSEN &: P. KRoNHAUSEN, supra note 66, at 261-89.
71. The Kronhausen study indicated that normal persons were sexually stimulated
by such variegated phenomena as warm sand and the sound of a pistol shot. Id. at 276·
77. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
72. 383 U.S. at 433. See also Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv.
655 (1964).
73. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The Hicklin case provided that material be judged by
the effect of an isolated excerpt upon "particularly susceptible persons." Early American
courts adopted this standard but later decisions rejected it in favor of the "average
person" standard employed in Roth. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89
(1957), and cases cited therein.
74. Lockhart &: McClure, supra note 11, at 296-97.
75. E. KRONHAUSEN &: P. KR0NHAUSEN, supra note 66, at 261-89.
76. H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1969).
77. Clor cites passages from Sartre's Erostratus and Joseph Heller's Catch-22 to
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Practice in many places has come close to eliminating censorship
for the adult reader. Indeed, one might suggest that only enough
condemnation and restriction remain to sustain the titillating effect
of forbiddenness. Stanley v. Georgia has not been a particularly controversial opinion. Despite the reputed conservative backlash, even
spokesmen for "decent literature" groups no longer stress the issue
of adult censorship; rather, the debate today focuses principally on
minors. But the Court needs a reasonably sound doctrinal underpinning for the elimination of adult censorship. Memoirs put us
on the right track. Since erotica is no longer presumptively without
redeeming social importance, the distinct constitutional treatment
historically given to it is no longer justifiable.78 Consequently, the
clear and present danger test should apply. Having come that far,
it is relatively easy to take the next step and to concede that no
proof of a clear and present danger can be adduced in the case of
any erotica disseminated to adults. 79 Such a result has certainty, and
is surely more soundly grounded than would be any result based
either upon a revisionist view of congressional power under the
commerce clause or upon a "revitalized" old-style substantive due
process.
VI.

PROTECTING THE MODEST

Elimination of restrictions on the dissemination of erotica to
adults leaves us with two remaining problems: (I) erotica and the
unwilling audience, and (2) erotica and minors. The former problem seems easier to manage. It is quite possible, and apparently pracillustrate his concept of degradation. Cr.oR, supra note 76, at 227-32. I think it is
dear from the context that he is citing Sartre and Heller as people who make the

same point with fiction which he makes with expositive writing. Yet it would not be
difficult at all for the more censorially inclined to get the idea from Clor that Heller
and Sartre themselves ought to be suppressed. Indeed, in the case of Heller, it would
not even be unreasonable for the censor to conclude that he had an ally in Clor (although Clor denies it). The passage from Catch-22 discussed by Clor is the crucial
one in which Yossarian opens his friend Snowden's flak suit and discovers that Snowden's insides have been literally pulverized by a piece of shrapnel. Yossarian thus discovers the "secret" that "[t]he spirit gone, man is garbage." J. HELLER, CATCH-22 450
(1962). Heller obviously believes that man must accept this fact and build value on
it. Clor, at least, suggests that it should be kept a secret. In fairness, it must be admitted that Clor makes a defense of Heller, based upon Clor's understanding of
Heller's intention; but it will have to be left to the reader of Clor and Heller to resolve the adequacy of the premise and conclusion.
78. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 419:
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming
social value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the requisite
prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of the three federal constitutional criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the book can
neither be weighed against or cancelled by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness.
'19, 38!! U.S. at 424, 4!ll-3!l CTustice Douglas, concurring).
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tical, to advertise the availability of erotica in a most discreet way.80
The current concern over using sex to sell products that are not
overtly sexual, such as automobiles, is probably more of a social
problem than a legal one. Advertisers, seeking the mass market,
are unlikely to exceed the actual current community standard of
candor.
Some problems may be created by the existence of what might
be called sexual evangelists-that is, persons who feel a need to
"liberate" the more inhibited by forcing erotica on their attention.
It is tempting to dismiss this issue by saying that a small but extant
body of the law of free speech deals with the problem of proselytizing an unwilling audience. 81 But the erotic evangelist is unique,
because while a political or religious tract or portrayal may be
viewed and rejected, the erotic liberator can win at least a partial
victory over the unwilling audience simply by having his materials
viewed. In the case of erotica, the medium is not only the message,
but the medium is in a sense an end in itself. Thus, historical tradition can be recognized and the balance struck in favor of the reluctant viewer. It is perhaps not unreasonable to require that the
proselytizers for sexual liberation utilize more traditional discourse
rather than taking the "direct action" of displaying erotica to the
unwilling.
Several considerations, however, should be kept in mind in dealing with erotica and the unwilling audience. First, it must be remembered that nuisance is the evil being attacked and thus that the
penalties invoked should be mild. Furthermore, care must be taken
that laws preventing the display of erotica to an unwilling audience
are not used for harassment. Finally, the courts must be on guard
to ensure that such laws are not twisted in application so as to
make the materials unavailable to willing audiences.

VII. WouLD You WANT YoUR DAUGHTER To READ ONE?
Finally, we come to the most perplexing problem-erotica and
the child. Whether or not erotica is harmful to children involves,
to some extent, the same considerations involved in determining
whether or not it is harmful to adults. While all would agree that
young minds are generally more impressionable than adult minds,
80. A shop directly across the street from the Ohio State University law school has
a sign which reads simply "BOOKSTORE, ADULT BOOKS AND MOVIES."
81. See, e.g., Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

June 1970]

Requiem for Requiems

1405

how they should be impressed is another question. Some believe
that man is born good and that unhealthy attitudes are cast upon
him by his elders. Others believe that man is born a craven animal
or marred by original sin and must be taught civilized values. This
problem is still today more metaphysical than scientific.82 Even
after one chooses a side on this issue, there is room for debate on
the problem of erotica and the child. I£ one assumes that man is
born good, it is still unclear whether free access to erotica is a
liberating or a corrupting stimulus for children. Similarly, one can
be consistent with the "need to be civilized" view of man by looking
upon the suppression of access to erotica either as the inculcation of
good morals or as the inculcation of sexual neurosis. 83 In either case,
one consideration appears inescapable: because of the slow physical
maturation of human beings, children are inevitably subject to the
influence of adults; and thus adults inevitably choose influences for
them. Justice Brennan sounded a familiar American, and I believe
libertarian, chord in Ginsberg when he said that our system recognizes the initial right of parents to do the choosing.84 It is not entirely specious to say that laws restricting distribution of erotica to
minors may be necessary in order to offer parents that choice.
The primary danger of such laws is that they may be used to
harass the distribution of constitutionally protected materials to
adults. For example, legislation making felonious the mailing of
material deemed "harmful to minors" into any home in which a
child under eighteen resides would obviously affect all distribution,
since the burden of producing guaranteed "adult only" mailing
82. For a discussion of the legal and social problems generated by the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian views of life, see generally, Laughlin, LSD-25
and the Other Hallucinogens: A Pre-Reform Proposal, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 23
(1967).
83. In footnote IO of Ginsberg (390 U.S. at 642), Justice Brennan cites Dr. Wilford
Gaylin, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 592-93 (1968). The worst that Dr. Gaylin has
to say with regard to harmful effects of erotica on children is that:
It is in the period of growth [of youth] when these patterns of behavior are laid
down, when environmental stimuli of all sorts must be integrated into a workable sense of self, when sensuality is being defined and fears elaborated, when
pleasure confronts security and impulse encounters control-it is in this period,
undramatically, and with time, that legalized pornography might conceivably be
damaging.
Dr. Gaylin goes on to distinguish between legalized erotica and blackmarket pornography by suggesting that the former may have a more harmful impact on children
since they will deem it to have parental approval. Whether or not this conclusion is
psychologically sound, it raises fundamental jurisprudential problems (as Dr. Gaylin
himself notes). It is basic to liberal society that the society does not fully approve of
all that it permits. To posit the opposite would by necessity lead to the corollary that
the law can permit only that of which the dominant elements of society fully approve
-the antithesis of libertarian government.
84. 390 U.S. at 639.
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lists would be insurmountable. Applying the "less drastic means"
approach,85 it is not unreasonable to suggest that the problem could
be handled by requiring that there be identifying marks on the envelopes and by giving parents the responsibility of requiring their
children not to open mail marked "adult." Adult bookstores should
not be any more difficult to police than adult taverns. Certainly
some erotica would find its way into children's hands without
parental consent, but it always has. Libraries could permit the use
of a parental authorization to admit minors into "mature" areas. In
the schools the availability of erotic materials would normally be a
political problem, for boards of education ordinarily set school
reading standards somewhere near contemporary community standards, influenced to some degree by more liberal-minded educators.
The problem of the dissenting teacher would arise in the larger
context of an academic-freedom question.86
The Court, however, cannot escape the problem of setting constitutional definitions of "harmful to minors," for there are always
those who wish to reach the youth market right up to the outer
limits of constitutional permissibility. These groups generally fall
into two classes. The first is the commercial interests; and with them
I find little difficulty in allowing the community to apply its contemporary standards, so long as parents or guardians are able freely to
procure restricted materials for their own wards. The second group
is a part of a larger movement, many of whose members are themselves "minors," which believes that the current definition of minority is set at too high a level and that some persons currently categorized as minors should be exposed to the adult market place of
ideas. As in the case of the dissenting teacher, this is part of a
larger problem, which in this situation probably entails recognizing
the evolution downward of the age of responsibility; and thus the
problem cannot and should not be solved solely in terms of laws dealing with erotica.87
85. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
86. The problem of the respective spheres of authority of teachers and school administrators in choosing classroom material has been a frequent source of dispute
within the teaching profession at both the secondary and higher-education levels.
L. JoucmN, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 105-06 (1967).
87. This is not to say that a unified definition of majority is the only plausible
answer to the problem. It may be that majority can be set at different ages for different
purposes. However, there are certain logical nexuses between certain activities so far as
majority is concerned. For example, it is surely not totally untenable to suggest that
those who are compelled to fight a war for a democratic nation should have a vote in
selecting the leaders who determine whether such a war should be fought. Similarly,
the age at which youth should be exposed to unshielded discussion of vital social issues
cannot be completely separated from the age at which they can consider the full range
of adult materials dealing with sex.
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I have purposefully discussed this aspect of the problem from
a policy-making point of view, for I think that this is the only practical way in which the Court can handle it. On the doctrinal level, it
seems that Ginsberg v. New York88 can be read as a simple recognition of the special tripartite relationship of government, minors,
and the Constitution, bearing in mind the admonition of In re
Gault 89 that the Constitution is not "for adults only." In this light,
the foregoing considerations can be seen as the parameters of "clear
and present danger" for situations in which minors are involved.

VIII.

KEEPING THE

EYE

UPON THE

RAn.

Constitutional problems are, at heart, social and political problems; and the Supreme Court is inextricably involved in a larger
political and social struggle. Despite Justice Frankfurter's yearning
for the atmosphere of a Hyde Park-an atmosphere devoid of any
need for the legal protection of free expression90-that atmosphere
does not in fact prevail. Furthermore, the abdication of judicial
responsibility in this area has inexorably led to the encouragement
of an attitude of repression, rather than to Justice Frankfurter's
hoped-for development of legislative responsibility in the protection
of civil liberties.91
The Court's power is finite (in fact tentative), and its resources
are exhaustible. Public respect for its process is its capital. But I
believe that it succeeds best by dealing straightforwardly with the
social problems which it confronts, as they relate to the substantive
principles embodied in the Constitution: "If we cannot use reason
to critique the substantive value of the Court's decisions, it is paradoxical that we should waste so much of it on the trappings." 92
88. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
89. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
90. Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 436. See also L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1959).
91. It is quite possible to accept Justice Frankfurter's and Judge Hand's premises
without accepting their conclusions. Thus, one can accept the premise that the best
safeguard for civil liberties lies in an enlightened public conscience, and one can also
accept the proposition that the institution of judicial review has contributed to an
attitude of constitutional irresponsibility on the part of nonjudicial officials and perhaps even the public at large. But at the same time one can reject, on the basis of
logic and empirical evidence, the idea that judicial self-restraint encourages legislative
responsibility. Neither Frankfurter nor Hand suggested abolishing the institution of
judicial review. So long as judicial review exists, legislators will construe the upholding of dubiously constitutional action as a victory and as encouragement for more
and further action of the same nature, despite the Court's protestation that its action
is based on "judicial restraint." See Frankfurter, supra note 35; L. HAND, supra note
90; Baldwin &: Laughlin, The Re-Apportionment Cases, A Study in the Constitutional
Adjudication Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 301 (1964).
92. Laughlin, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REv. 97, 103-04
(1969).
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Lawyers and laymen alike recognize that the Court must utilize
doctrines and rules of decision making in principled adjudication.
Those rules are best trusted when they are based upon time-tested
principles, or rationally evolved from such principles, or when they
are proved by empirical evidence or sound reasoning to be superior
to existing principles. Too many academic commentators overlook
this fundamental tenet of constitutional adjudication when they
propose their intricate new jurisprudences.

